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abstract
This article examines the amnesty powers granted to a variety of  truth 
commissions (TC). It considers whether the process by which TCs are able 
to recommend for perpetrators who cooperate with TCs (and usually pro-
vide truth) has ensured that such individuals come forward and cooperate 
with these institutions. This is decisive, as TCs everywhere experience diffi-
culties in obtaining perpetrator cooperation and testimony. Crucially, unlike 
the South African TC, which had the power to directly grant amnesty, later 
TCs have only been able to recommend, to their governments, that amnesty 
be granted to specific persons who meet criteria laid out in the specific TC’s 
legal mandate. The article therefore examines the efficacy of  TC amnesty 
powers in South Africa, Grenada, Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of  
the Congo (DRC), Nepal, Timor-Leste/Indonesia, Liberia, Kenya, South 
Korea, and Timor-Leste. All these institutions had different provisions as 
to when, and for what reasons they could make a recommendation that 
amnesty be given (besides the South African TC which could directly grant 
amnesty). This article touches on some of  the problems that may occur 
during such processes that need careful attention to ensure that perpetrators 
enter such conditional amnesty processes, and tell the truth once they do. 
The lessons learnt from the various TC amnesty processes are brought to 
the fore to determine what future TCs ought to bear in mind should it be 
decided to use conditional amnesty methods.
Keywords: Transitional Justice, truth commissions, truth, amnesty, condi-
tional amnesty, immunity, pardons, perpetrator, search and seizure, South 
Africa, Grenada, Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of  the Congo, Timor-
Leste, Indonesia, Liberia, Kenya, and South Korea.
resumo
Este artigo examina os poderes de anistia concedidos a uma variedade de 
comissões da verdade (TC). Ele considera se o processo pelo qual os TCs 
podem recomendar aos perpetradores que cooperam com os TCs (e ge-
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ralmente fornecem verdades) assegurou que tais indiví-
duos se apresentem e cooperem com essas instituições. 
Isso é decisivo, pois as TCs em todos os lugares enfren-
tam dificuldades para obter a cooperação e o testemu-
nho do perpetrador. Crucialmente, diferentemente da 
TC Sul-Africana, que tinha o poder de conceder anistia 
diretamente, os TCs posteriores só puderam recomen-
dar aos seus governos que a anistia fosse concedida às 
pessoas específicas que atendessem aos critérios esta-
belecidos no mandato legal da TC. O artigo examina a 
eficácia dos poderes de anistia da TC na África do Sul, 
Granada, Indonésia, República Democrática do Congo 
(RDC), Nepal, Timor-Leste / Indonésia, Libéria, Quê-
nia, Coréia do Sul e Timor-Leste. Todas essas institui-
ções tinham disposições diferentes sobre quando e por 
quais motivos poderiam fazer uma recomendação de 
anistia (além do TC sul-africano que poderia conceder 
anistia diretamente). Este artigo aborda alguns dos pro-
blemas que podem ocorrer durante esses processos, que 
requerem cuidadosa atenção para garantir que os auto-
res entrem em tais processos de anistia condicional e 
digam a verdade quando o fizerem. As lições aprendidas 
com os vários processos de anistia da TC são trazidas 
à tona para determinar o que os futuros TCs devem ter 
em mente caso seja decidido usar métodos condicionais 
de anistia.
Palavras-chave : Justiça Transicional, comissões da 
verdade, verdade, anistia, anistia condicional, imuni-
dade, perdão, perpetrador, busca e apreensão, África 
do Sul, Granada, Indonésia, República Democrática 
do Congo, Timor-Leste, Indonésia, Libéria, Quênia e 
Coréia do Sul .
1. introduction
The role and function of  truth commissions (TCs) 
are generally viewed to be important in post conflict so-
cieties.1 Their roles are however contested.2 Some have 
1  Jeremy Sarkin and Tetevi Davi, “Examining the Criticisms Lev-
elled Against Transitional Justice: Towards An Understanding of  
the State of  the Field”, Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, 
11(1). (2017): 7-22.
2  David Mendlloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?” International Studies 
Review, 6 (2004): 355- 80; but see a more positive study Olsen, Tricia 
D., Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G, Reiter, “Transitional Justice in 
Balance, Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy.” (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of  Peace Press) 2010. 
challenged the extent to which these institutions have 
had positive effects, or have adequately addressed the 
human rights situation in that country on their own.3 
The fact is that there have been more than 50 truth 
commissions that fall within the often-narrow defini-
tion of  a TC (and many more if  a wider definition is 
used). However, there have been many more of  the-
se institutions that some commentators do not inclu-
de within the classification of  a TC. The fact that such 
processes are so regularly established in so many places 
around the world indicates that they are widely recog-
nised as playing at least somewhat important functions. 
Such institutions, and a range of  other similar mecha-
nisms, have multiple and varied objectives. Borer, for 
example, has argued that TCs have 26 different objecti-
ves.4 Obviously, the main area that TCs are involved in 
is truth gathering. Part of  this exercise is about memory 
and can be more helpful than other tools in “devising 
a new national narrative.”5 Another goal is accountabi-
lity. Accountability is somewhat controversially linked 
to TCs as many have the perception that TCs actually 
reduce accountability as they often replace trials and re-
tributive justice. However, it has been argued that TCs 
do not impact the human rights situation in a country 
without the accompanying trials and amnesties.6
Today, the right to the truth is recognised as an inter-
national right. In this context, the issue remains about 
how to ensure that victims enjoy that right in practi-
ce. While the right to the truth is available in a range 
of  treaties and other international legal principles, the 
benefit to victims is not always realised. One institutio-
nal home for truth recovery, especially for the needs of  
victims, are truth commissions. Truth commissions are 
useful vehicles in this regard depending on how they are 
established and what resources they have at their dispo-
sal to embark on the truth collecting enterprise. 
3  Johannes Langer, “Are Truth Commissions Just Hot-Air Bal-
loons? A Reality Check on the Impact of  Truth Commission Rec-
ommendations.” Desafíos 29.1 (2017): 177-210.
4  Anne Borer Tristan, ‘Truth Telling as a Peace-Building Activity: 
A Theoretical Overview,’ in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace 
Building in Post-Conflict Societies, ed. Anne Borer Tristan (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of  Notre Dame Press, 2006), 26.
5  Martha Minow, “Making History or Making Peace: When Pros-
ecutions Should Give Way to Truth Commissions and Peace Nego-
tiations”, Journal of  Human Rights, 7(2). (2008): 180.
6  Tricia D.Olsen; Leigh A. Payne; Andrew G. Reiter, and Eric 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, “When Truth Commissions Improve Human 
Rights”, The International Journal of  Transitional Justice, 4 (2010): 457–
476.
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The way in which amnesties are used, and can be 
used by truth and reconciliation commissions to gain 
truth remains an understudied area. Generally, when 
the topic is discussed it focuses on when amnesties 
are legally permitted in international law.7 When spe-
cific TCs are discussed, it is usually in relation to the 
South African process, which allowed its TC to grant 
amnesty that is discussed. While it is true that South 
Africa’s conditional amnesty has been acknowledged as 
the most legally stringent and politically legitimate of  
amnesties established in post-conflict societies,8 it is still 
very controversial.9 In spite of  it being democratically 
enacted through Parliament,10 at least one reason for the 
controversy surrounding the process is because it gave 
amnesty for all offences, and did not exclude serious 
international crimes.11 
A number of  TCs since the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission have been given the power 
to recommend to government that amnesty is granted 
to individual perpetrators who have committed offen-
ces. None of  these later institutions were actually given 
the power to grant amnesty. Countries where TCs were 
involved in recommending amnesties include the pro-
cesses in Grenada, Indonesia, the Democratic Republic 
of  the Congo (DRC), in Timor-Leste/Indonesia in the 
joint Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF), and 
Liberia to name a few. A number of  other processes 
were to be established with such powers, however they 
were either never set up, were struck down by the courts 
or never used their powers. These are discussed briefly 
in the article.
This article examines the amnesty powers granted 
to a variety of  TCs. It considers whether the process 
by which TCs are able to recommend amnesty to spe-
cific perpetrators who cooperate with TCs and provide 
truth, has ensured that such individuals come forward 
and cooperate. This is decisive, as TCs “experience di-
7  Francesca Lessa, Amnesty in the Age of  Human Rights Account-
ability: Comparative and International Perspectives, ed. Payne, Leigh 
A.(Cambridge University Press 2014; Cambridge, U.K).
8  Richard A. Wilson, The Politics of  Truth and Reconciliation in South 
Africa – Legitimising the Post-Apartheid State, (Cambridge University 
Press 2011; Cambridge) 23.
9  Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice 
(Cambridge University Press 2009; Cambridge, U.K.).
10  Jeremy Sarkin, “The Development of  a Human Rights Culture 
in South Africa” Human Rights Quarterly 20(3), (1998): 628-655.
11  Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: 
Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide.( Bloomsbury 2008; U.K.).
fficulties in obtaining detailed perpetrator testimony.”12 
Crucially, unlike the South African TC that - as discus-
sed below - had the power to directly grant amnesty, 
later TCs were only able to recommend to their govern-
ments that amnesty be granted to specific persons who 
had met the criteria laid out in the specific TC’s legal 
mandate.13 
All these institutions had different provisions as to 
when, and for what reasons they could make such a re-
commendation that amnesty be given. The only process 
that was different, where the commission could not 
recommend amnesty for perpetrators, was that whi-
ch occurred in Timor-Leste from 2001. This process 
allowed the truth commission to assist perpetrators to 
obtain immunity,14 through a community reconciliation 
programme.15 It must be noted that immunity was to 
be given, not amnesty. The ability to grant immunity 
to perpetrators in Timor-Leste however was not in the 
remit of  the commission. It had to be done by the com-
mission in association with the prosecuting authority 
and with the concurrence of  the courts. However, as 
discussed below, the only recommending model where 
perpetrators entered the process in any numbers was 
the one in Timor-Leste. There, perpetrators knew their 
names were known, seemed to trust the process more, 
and had more certainty that once they entered the pro-
cess, a positive outcome would result.
This article touches on some of  the problems that 
may occur during such processes; problems that need 
careful evaluation to ensure that perpetrators enter a 
conditional amnesty process and tell the truth once they 
have entered the process.16 The lessons learnt from the 
various processes where amnesty was directly granted 
(South Africa) and those where the TC only had powers 
to recommend amnesty are compared to determine 
what best practises be recommended for future condi-
tional amnesty processes in TC activities.
12  Natalie Pierce, “Picking up the Pieces: Truth and Justice in 
Sierra Leone.” NZJPIL 6 (2008): 117, 120.
13  Amnesty International, Commissioning Justice: Truth Commissions 
and Criminal Justice, April 2010, at 5.
14  Chega Part 9, paras. 3-4.
15  Patrick Burgess, “Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor: 
The Relationship between the Commission for Reception, Truth 
and Reconciliation and the Courts,” Criminal Law Forum 15 (2004): 
135–158.
16  See for example Rudi Teitel, “The Law and Politics of  Con-
temporary Transitional Justice”
Cornell International Law Journal 38(3) (2005): 836–62.
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2. providing amnesty to perpetrators
States that want to deal with past conflict employ a 
series of  mechanisms to achieve peace and lasting sta-
bility. 17 As a result, in post-conflict societies the use of  
amnesties is a common, yet contested tool.18 During the 
period between 1945 and 2011, 537 amnesties occurred 
in 127 countries. Of  these, 398 amnesties materialised 
after 1979.19 The constitutions of  186 states mention 
either amnesty or pardon. Today, states are conducting 
amnesty proceedings as a recurring practice.20 
Amnesty popularly perceived as a method to prevent 
perpetrators from assuming their responsibilities. It is 
often understood as a way of  avoiding fairness and pro-
moting impunity. 21 At times, however, this mechanism 
should be understood as a tool for the reconciling socie-
ty. 22 Nonetheless is important to note that sometimes 
these processes do not use the term amnesty, but use a 
range of  other similar terms. Thus, immunity, pardon 
and other such terms can be used, at times, interchan-
geably with amnesty. However, immunity, as a term, is 
legally different to amnesty. Thus, the UN Rule-of-Law 
Tools for Truth Commissions argues that: “the granting 
of  amnesty should not be confused with granting use 
immunity which is acceptable under international law.”23 
Thus, the key question is what does “Use immunity” 
or “immunity” means and how is it distinguished from 
amnesty? Immunity, legally speaking if  it is applied in 
this sense, does not terminate criminal accountability or 
liability. It only ensures that certain evidence is preclu-
ded from being used in a case against a person.24 Thus, 
17  Nesiah Vasuki “Transitional Justice Practice: Looking Back, 
Moving Forward” Research Report of  Impunity Watch, (2016): 11.
18  Helena Cobban, Amnesty After Atrocity? (Paradigm Publishers 
2007, New York, USA).
19  Louise Mallinder, “Amnesties’ Challenge to the Accountability 
Norm? Interpreting Regional and International Trends in Amnesty 
Enactment”, in Leigh A. Payne and Francesca Lessa, Amnesty in the 
Age of  Human Rights Accountability: Comparative and International Perspec-
tives (Cambridge University Press 2012, Cambridge, U.K.) 79. 
20  Francesca Lessa and others, “Persistent or Eroding Impunity? 
The Divergent Effects of  Legal Challenges to Amnesty Laws For 
Past Human Rights Violations” Israel Law Review 47, (2014):105.
21  Aryeh Neier, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide and the Struggle for 
Justice (Times Books 1998).
22  Patricia Naftali, “Crafting a ‘Right To Truth’ in International 
Law: Converging Mobilizations, Diverging Agendas?”, Champ Pénal, 
13 (2016).
23  United Nations OHCHR Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict 
States: Truth Commissions”, 10-12.
24  Patricia Lundy. “Commissioning the Past in Northern Ireland” 
Review of  International Affairs, 60 (2010).
it is much narrower, and has less legal effect if  defined 
in its common way, for the person to whom it is being 
applied.
There are different forms of  amnesty such as con-
ditional amnesty, limited amnesty and blanket amnesty. 
Self-amnesty, as some have argued, deserves to be in a 
separate group.25 Yet, it is also true that the three sorts 
of  amnesty referred to above, could fall into the self-
-amnesty group.
A blanket amnesty is defined as covering all viola-
tions that occurred during a limited period of  time.26 A 
limited type of  amnesty, on the contrary, covers certain 
types of  crimes, certain perpetrators, or certain time pe-
riods when the crimes were committed. Finally, a con-
ditional amnesty is only given when the applicants fulfil 
certain requirements and conditions.
Various countries have used conditional amnesties 
as a mechanism to deal with the past. It can assist in 
truth recovery if  amnesty is exchanged for truth. Con-
ditional amnesties can usually provide substantially 
more truth than is currently the case in processes that 
typically rely on victim testimony. Amnesty should not 
be granted without perpetrators at least providing in-
formation about the acts for which they need amnesty.
Conditional amnesties are seen to be the most ac-
ceptable because they are the most accountable of  all 
amnesties. Perpetrators have to provide something in 
return for amnesty. They have to go through a process. 
They are identified. Perpetrators are publicly named, 
which therefore should reduce impunity. Conditional 
amnesties seem to be more legitimate and reliable than 
amnesties that do not have any accountability.27 Indeed, 
they require some sort of  responsibility and, at the same 
time, obtain truth recovery for victims.28 By definition, 
conditional amnesties give information about the iden-
tity of  the perpetrators as well as the specific abuses 
they committed. Hence, truth telling becomes one of  
the main aspects of  conditional amnesties. Depending 
25  Kate Allan, “Prosecution and Peace: A Role for Amnesty Be-
fore the ICC?” Denver Journal of  Internationa Law and Policy, 39 (2010): 
239, 242.
26  Jacob Childers, “Amnesty, Revenge, and the Threat of  Conflict 
Relapse” International Criminal Law Review 14.6 (2014): 1095-1122.
27  David Weissbrodt, “Review Of  Andreas O’Shea, Amnesty For 
Crime In International Law And Practice” American Journal of  Inter-
national Law 97 (2003): 227.
28  Allan, “Prosecution And Peace: A Role For Amnesty Before The 
ICC?”, 239.
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on how the amnesties are applied they may prove to be 
quite useful truth-clarifying processes. With more trans-
parency and a more open society when dealing with its 
past, greater guarantees of  democratic stability can be 
achieved. Still, one of  the main controversies is whether 
giving amnesties to perpetrators is more likely to benefit 
them than ensuring they are prosecuted for the crimes 
they committed. 
As far as the usage of  conditional amnesty for truth-
-seeking purposes is concerned, after the transitional 
justice process in South Africa, several countries have 
given powers to truth commissions to deal with amnes-
ties. However those truth Commissions were often only 
given the power to recommend to governments that 
certain perpetrators should be amnestied in exchange 
for a specific set of  conditions. These powers were pro-
vided in an attempt to enhance perpetrator cooperation 
with such processes that had largely not occurred befo-
re, without specific incentives for them to do so. Thus, 
a range of  TCs were given such powers because one 
of  the goals of  TCs, often stated, is: “who did what to 
whom, when, where, and occasionally why.”29 However, 
critical questions, which often remain unanswered, are 
asked about perpetrators, and, specifically who they are 
and what they did. This is because, generally speaking, 
these institutions rely on victims and their testimonies to 
achieve these purposes, as perpetrators in the main do 
not cooperate with such mechanisms. Thus, while TCs 
also conduct research, or collate research that was pre-
viously conducted depending on the available resources, 
it is victim testimony that is usually the major source of  
information for TCs. They are however, only part (and 
sometimes only a small part) of  the overall picture of  
the past. This is because victims often have a very limi-
ted knowledge about the misdeeds that occurred. Their 
knowledge about who gave orders, what the chain of  
command was, who provided the arms and ammuni-
tion, who else was involved in the conspiracy and others 
is often incomplete. Victims have limited knowledge, as 
they may not even have been present when the atrocity 
was committed. If  they were present, they usually have 
very little knowledge about what planning went into it 
and what transpired. Despite victims knowing so little 
about what occurred to them or how the abuses in ge-
neral were perpetrated, truth commissions, in general, 
29  Cyanne E. Loyle and Christian Davenport “Transitional In-
justice: Subverting Justice in Transition and Postconflict Societies”, 
Journal of  Human Rights, 15(1), (2015): 126-149. 
rely largely on their testimonies.30 
At least an element of  knowledge about the past lies 
with the perpetrators. However, with some limited ex-
ceptions, this group almost universally does not coope-
rate with TCs. These exceptions often occur for politi-
cal reasons, where a high-profile person is already aware 
that what they have done is widely known, or because 
they wish to exploit what they have done for political 
reasons. 
However, perpetrators fear the legal consequences 
of  appearing before TCs without some sort of  legal 
cover. They often seek legal assurances that the infor-
mation they provide will not be used against them at 
a later stage in either criminal or civil cases. Thus, for 
perpetrators to participate they need to receive some 
incentive to encourage them to explain what they did 
and what the circumstances were. Indeed, the more in-
centives the perpetrators receive, the more information 
will be provided for truth recovery. Perpetrators would 
be more inclined to tell the truth when they are feeling 
less threatened by the prospect of  being prosecuted. As 
Bisset notes:
If  perpetrators suspect that there is a possibility that 
amnesty will be refused and that their disclosures 
might then be used to further investigations or 
employed against them in subsequent trials they 
will be less likely to participate, thereby limiting the 
prospects for reconciliation.31
Realising the problems that perpetrators are reluc-
tant to appear voluntarily before truth collection ins-
titutions, some processes have found ways to ensure 
that perpetrators do testify. They do this because they 
realise that if  a primary objective is to create an autho-
ritative record of  the past and to provide some type of  
accountability for perpetrators32, then getting perpetra-
tor cooperation is necessary even if  it is only to some 
degree. Amnesties can thus be a tool to provide the tru-
th about events and violations committed. Finding the 
truth about what happened helps to reconcile a society 
divided by its history.33 It establishes an ideal basis for 
30  See issues concerning victim testimony, Moon, C Narrating 
Political Reconciliation: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
(Lanham, U.K.; Lexington Books, 2008).
31  Alison Bisset, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in 
Truth Commission-Administered Accountability Initiatives.” Leiden 
Journal of  International Law 30.1 (2017): 173.
32  Margaret Popkin, Truth without Justice, (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State Press, 2000) 80.
33  Janine N. Clarke, “Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconcili-
ation: An Under-Explored Relationship” International Criminal Law 
Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 15, n. 3, dez. 2018.
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building a democratic state and for achieving a united 
society.34 
For this reason, some TCs are given, and employ 
powers of  subpoena, or search and seizure powers in 
order to get perpetrators to appear and testify or to find 
information.35 Some processes, such as that which oc-
curred in Sierra Leone, have used these powers to coer-
ce perpetrators to appear before the TC, by threatening 
to use such powers. Some processes allow potential 
witnesses to feel more protected by guaranteeing that 
information obtained cannot not be used in later legal 
proceedings against the perpetrator. Some institutions, 
like the TC in Liberia, have published the names of  
those believed to have committed crimes36 during the 
process in order to try and herd such people into the 
processes on the basis that, formally or informally, they 
will be rewarded for their cooperation by assurances of  
non-prosecution.37 Still other processes have collected 
information from perpetrators through vetting or lus-
tration processes. These processes ensure that perpetra-
tors, in order to keep their jobs or to obtain new ones, 
have to provide information about what they have done 
on pain of  perjury and against investigations that check 
the veracity of  their information.
In order to achieve a successful conditional amnes-
ty the process must ensure that the perpetrators apply 
for that amnesty. Therefore, a conditional amnesty must 
have two essential components to be successful. Firs-
tly, the process has to ensure the perpetrators decide 
to participate, while on the other hand, it has to ensure 
that the participation of  these actors serves to clarify 
the whole truth. Regarding the first part, the applicants 
have to believe that the amnesty is necessary to them. 
If  this were not the case, what would be the reason to 
Review, 11 (2011):241.
34  Grace Fiddler, “Using A Conditional Amnesty And Truth And 
Reconciliation Commission As A Transitional Justice Mechanism In 
Syria” The George Washington Institute of  International Law Review 47 
(2015): 893, 917.
35  On the protections that ought to be available see Bisset, A 
“Principle 9: Guarantees for Persons Implicated” in The United Na-
tions Principles to Combat Impunity a Commentary, eds. Haldemann and 
Unger, (2017) OUP.
36  On the shaming effect see Mendeloff, D. “Truth-Seeking, 
Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusi-
asm?” International Studies Review, 6(3), (2004): 361.
37  Jeremy Sarkin and Tetvi Davi, “The Togolese Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission: Lessons for Transitional Justice 
Processes Elsewhere.” Peace and Conflict Studies Journal 24(1), (2017): 
1-27.
participate in such processes of  conditional amnesty?
To make a conditional amnesty viable, it must begin 
by dealing some of  the crimes committed by the perpe-
trators from the outset, or at least indicate its commit-
ment to prosecute those who do not enter the amnesty 
process. Thus, a unit ought to be established and public 
pronouncements ought to be clear that prosecutions 
will occur for those who do not apply. By doing so, the 
perpetrators will see that availing themselves of  an am-
nesty will benefit them and that not doing so will have 
ramifications. It demonstrates not only the state’s ability 
to prosecute crimes and abuses, but also a clear political 
will to do so. 
The second essential component of  a viable am-
nesty is to ensure that the perpetrators involved in the 
process tell the truth about everything that happened. 
Thus, there must be mechanisms to ensure that the real 
truth is told and machineries of  revocation of  amnesty 
and perjury processes should be established. As far as 
revocation is concerned, if  it were discovered that the-
re was no proper cooperation or that the perpetrator 
did not reveal the truth, it should be possible to revoke 
the request for amnesty. In addition, there needs to be 
a clause dealing with perjury to avoid lies during the 
process. Such cases should even end with imprison-
ments and other penalties to dissuade those who might 
otherwise not use the process fairly.
The probability that a conditional amnesty will be 
viable increases if  done within a simple framework 
that ensures the participation of  perpetrators. Thus, 
following a pragmatic approach, it would help the per-
petrators if  they were to meet simplified requirements. 
The eligibility criteria for amnesty should be simple and 
easy to understand. The purpose of  establishing easy 
criteria is to facilitate the participation of  the perpetra-
tors. However, it is also necessary to establish a unit of  
investigation that is dedicated to prosecuting the crimes 
and abuses committed by those who did not want to 
request amnesty. Therefore, criminal investigation of  
responsible actors should not be left out of  the political 
process, and should go hand in hand with the amnesty 
process.
To make the amnesty viable, the perpetrators must 
see the need to apply for it. This should be done throu-
gh some independent institution like a truth commis-
sion. It can be done though another process as long 
as the process is credible and trustworthy. While there 
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are some who suggest that perpetrators might surren-
der without any amnesty condition and there are cases 
of  perpetrators who have come forward, the reality is 
that very few perpetrators do so without the necessary 
incentives. The issue of  perpetrator motivations is an 
understudied issue, but often their reasons for coming 
forward is personal. However, there may be institutional 
reasons for them to do so. 
3. the role of the south african tc in 
granting amnesty
This section examines the South African TC process 
as a comparative tool, as it is the only TC that has had 
the power to grant full amnesty. The power to grant am-
nesty was given to the TC38 as a result of  a compromise 
between the conflicting parties during negotiations. An 
agreement was struck to allow an amnesty to occur that 
would allow the country to move to non-racial elections 
and democratic transformation.39 As assurances were 
sought that amnesty would occur, it was incorporated 
into the interim Constitution that was legislated in 1993 
by the Apartheid regime. The interim Constitution ente-
red into force when the democratic elections were held 
in April 1994. The next step in terms of  dealing with 
the past was the establishment of  the TC. Such a pro-
cess was deemed the best way to deal with past human 
rights violations. After much parliamentary and public 
debate, the TC and amnesty process was established.40 
It was perceived that the most legitimate, and best way, 
to obtain as much truth about the past as possible, was 
to link the truth-gathering exercise to the amnesty pro-
cess. Thus, truth would be traded for amnesty and one 
of  the goals of  the TC was to facilitate “the granting of  
amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of  all the 
relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political 
objective and comply with the requirement of  this Act.” 
The TC Act41 provided that:
38  South Africa, Promotion of  National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act 1995.
39  Jeremy Sarkin, “Understanding the Journey to Reconciliation 
in Transitional Societies: Using the Metaphor of  a Motor Vehicle 
Road Trip to Understand South Africa’s Path (Process) to Politi-
cal Reconciliation” International Journal of  Renaissance Studies 10(2), 
(2015):109.
40  Promotion of  National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of  
1995.
41  Act 200 of  1993.
amnesty shall be granted in respect of  acts, 
omissions and offences associated with political 
objectives and committed in the course of  conflicts 
of  the past. To this end Parliament under the 
constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm 
cut-off  date, which shall be a date after 8 October 
1990, and before 6 December 1993, and providing 
mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including 
tribunals, if  any, through which such amnesty shall 
be dealt with at any time after the law has been 
passed.
The TC legislation provided for three committees 
including an amnesty committee. As will be discussed 
later in the article, one of  the reasons why people who 
seek amnesty enter such a process is because there is 
some degree of  certainty that amnesty will be granted. 
Perpetrators are not usually willing to navigate a process 
where there is a great deal of  doubt about whether am-
nesty will be granted. In this regard, the Amnesty Com-
mittee was somewhat insulated from the rest of  the TC. 
People who, as a rule, inspired confidence were chosen 
to be on that committee as they were initially judges 
while others were seen to from the same political milieu 
as those from the security forces. Thus, those who may 
have had political issues with the TC Commissioners 
probably found solace in the fact that it was judges who 
were to make amnesty decisions.
The number of  amnesty applicants in the South 
African process was far higher than that of  any other 
amnesty processes where a TC was involved. This is 
not to argue that all or even most perpetrators applied. 
While 7,116 individuals applied for amnesty, of  which 
1,167 were granted, how many should have applied is 
unknown, but if  there were to be an examination of  the 
extent of  violations committed during the Apartheid 
era, it is expected that there ought to have been more 
applicants.42 Crucially, the number of  7,116 applicants 
is not an accurate number as about 4,500 of  them were 
not seen to be real applicants, but people in prison at 
the time who tried to use the process to get released, but 
had not actually committed politically related offences.43 
Irrespective of  this, the issue of  whether a reasonable 
proportion of  those who committed violations applied 
for amnesty is linked to the question about whether 
potential applicants believed they needed amnesty. The 
42  Rajeev Bhargava, Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies in “Truth 
versus justice: the morality of  truth commissions” Eds. Robert I. 
Rotberg & Dennis Thompson (Princeton University Press 2000, 
USA): 45, 65 fn 35.
43  Volume Six Section 1 Chapter 2 paragraph 74.
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number of  applicants was affected by the fact that shor-
tly before the cut off  point for amnesty applications, 
the biggest trial for politically related crimes, known as 
the Malan trial,44 ended in the acquittal of  all of  the 23 
accused. The defendants in that trial included a former 
minister of  defence, other senior politicians and secu-
rity force individuals, as well as a range of  hit squad 
operatives. The message that the acquittals sent was that 
even if  the state had the political will to prosecute, it did 
not have the capacity or the resources to effect succes-
sful prosecutions. 
The lack of  political will by the state to prosecute 
was seen in the fact that the prosecuting authority at 
that time had already shown reluctance to investigate 
and bring such cases to court because of  their fears 
about what prosecuting some perpetrators might mean 
for the ruling party. For the amnesty process to be suc-
cessful both the carrot and stick had to work: in other 
words there needs to be an inducement to get amnes-
ty but there has to be a stick to indicate that amnesty 
is needed and that those who do not get amnesty will 
be successfully prosecuted. In other words, the carrot 
of  amnesty is dependent on the stick of  prosecutions. 
The two are inter-related and cannot operate without 
each other. Therefore, in the South African context 
the amnesty process was reliant on its counterpart: the 
criminal justice system. For the amnesty to work, the 
criminal justice system had to apply pressure on tho-
se who potentially needed amnesty. However, through 
words and deeds the impression given by the prosecu-
tors was that the justice system would not deliver on 
such cases. Even the bringing to court of  the Malan 
trial was an aberration. That trial was only prosecuted 
as a result of  an independent task team, and the role of  
independent lawyers tasked to investigate and prosecu-
te such cases. In any case, many obstacles were placed 
in their way that ensured no other cases were brought 
despite the lawyers and investigators wishing to do so. 
The prosecuting authority itself  did not investigate 
many cases and this reluctance was seen as a sign by 
perpetrators that amnesty might not be needed by many 
of  them. As a result, at least some prospective amnesty 
candidates did not enter the process. However, some 
applicants, at least from the security forces, entered into 
the process because they had some degree of  belief  in 
44  Howard Varney and Jeremy Sarkin, “Failing to pierce the hit 
squad veil: A critique of  the Malan Trial”, 10 South African Journal of  
Criminal Justice, 141, (1997).
the system. They were gratified that the system was not 
theoretically dependent on decisions of  partisan TC 
commissioners. Those that did enter into the process, 
from the Apartheid regime side, had greater trust in the 
amnesty system, as it was to be administered mainly by 
judges who were independently appointed as judges. In 
fact, there was a great deal of  trust in the judiciary by 
the white community, who believed that judges were 
of  high standing and could be trusted to apply the law 
impartially. At that time almost all judges were white 
men who came from the same milieu as the applicants 
from the security forces. Judges were for the most part 
from the same social group as the apartheid instigators. 
In addition, those who applied for amnesty probably 
also believed that these judges would apply strict legal 
criteria that would permit no political decision-making. 
Some, however, in spite of  this, believed that they did 
not need amnesty and were willing to take their chances 
that they would not need amnesty.
On the question of  how much truth was achieved 
through the amnesty process it seems as though more 
truth, that would not otherwise have done so, emerged. 
However, it seems as though some applicants colluded 
with each other in order to conceal what they knew. The 
lead investigator in one of  the cases has noted that the 
applicants:
presented a well-oiled account of  events that 
carefully interlocked and reinforced each other’s 
versions in many aspects. Some sections of  their 
written applications even used identical script and 
turns of  phrase, leaving the impression that they 
could have been contrived and selective on detail.45
These kinds of  problems could have been avoided 
to some degree by an adequate investigation process. 
Deficiencies in investigations because of  a lack of  staff, 
resources as well as other difficulties did not allow for 
sufficient investigations to determine the veracity of  
what applicants testified to. The limited role of  victims 
during the amnesty process also affected the ability of  
applicants to be less than truthful as the credibility of  
their versions of  what occurred was not always tested 
or tested adequately. Victims were not usually informed 
about what candidates had stated in their applications. 
Many victims failed to get to amnesty hearings either 
because they were not informed about them, or not in-
45  Piers Pigou, “Degrees Of  Truth: Amnesty And Limitations In 
The Truth Recovery Project” in The Provocations of  Amnesty: Memory, 
Justice and Impunity, Eds. Villa-Vicencio, Charles; and Doxtader, Erik 
(Cape Town, 2003).
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formed with time enough to allow them to put forward 
alternative versions of  what was being said.46 An ade-
quate investigation process and methods that ensured a 
better role for victims (situations that should have been 
in place anyway) would have been a way to provide a 
further check on the testimony of  applicants. Obviou-
sly, this will not always be the case but is dependent on 
what violation was committed and whether there are 
victims with direct knowledge of  what occurred. 
Overall, it can be concluded that there were positive 
and negative aspects of  the SA TC’s amnesty process. 
Certainly, giving the TC the power to directly grant am-
nesty, with that power being exercised by professional 
judges appointed through the usual judicial appoint-
ment processes, seems to have had a positive effect on 
the process. The negative aspects of  the process were 
the parallel lack of  commitment by the state to investi-
gate cases at the time. This indicates a true commitment 
to prosecute those who did not apply or who were re-
fused amnesty. The amnesty law and how it worked was 
also problematic. The process was too complicated, too 
cumbersome and too slow. 
A lesson from the South African process is that the 
number of  people applying for amnesty is dependent 
on a number of  factors, which include how the amnesty 
process is established, what the law is, what the crite-
ria are, and whether the process engenders trust. These 
components are all important in influencing the deci-
sion by the perpetrator as to whether or not they will 
enter the process. Crucially, it is not only the law and the 
institution granting amnesty that are the determinants 
about whether potential applicants decide to apply. Per-
petrators also evaluate whether they need amnesty or 
not. If  they believe that there will not be prosecutions, 
or that these prosecutions will be unsuccessful, then 
they are less likely to apply. Thus, there needs to be a ri-
gorous, independent investigation and prosecuting pro-
cess to indicate capacity and willingness to prosecute 
those who do not enter the amnesty process. 
Another lesson from the South African process for 
future conditional amnesty processes, whether adminis-
tered by TCs or not, which will limit the possibility of  
applicants not telling the full truth, is that there needs 
46  Jeremy Sarkin, “An Evaluation of  the South African Amnesty 
Process” in Truth and Reconciliation: Did the TC Deliver. Eds. Chap-
man, Audrey and Van der Merwe, Hugo (University of  Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia 2008): 93-115.
to be a provision that amnesty can be withdrawn if  it is 
later found that full disclosure had not occurred. There 
must however be a provision about what process should 
occur after the TC is no longer in existence. Thus, it is 
essential that there is an institution that can make such a 
determination later. This could be a court or the prose-
cuting authority that is given such jurisdiction. Thus, an 
on-going mechanism to take up such matters would act 
somewhat as a bulwark again perpetrators being loose 
with the truth.
A useful provision in the South African law allowed 
perpetrators to be summoned to appear at a hearing un-
der subpoena where they had to reveal the truth under 
pain of  prosecution. These powers, as well as search 
and seizure provisions, which the SA TRC hardly used, 
are useful mechanisms that drafters of  other TC laws 
could consider.
The final issue to note as far as the impact of  the 
South African process is concerned is that the South 
African model:
helped turn truth commissions into a widely 
recognised solution for dealing with the past. Truth 
commissions therefore emerged as a standard tool 
to master political transition processes successfully.47 
However its amnesty process has not been replica-
ted anywhere else. What has occurred is that the South 
African legislation has been copied elsewhere to some 
degree, but not exactly. For example, the Kenyan TJRC’s 
provisions replicated the SA TC provisions, in places, 
word for word. However, the Kenyan TJRC, as is dis-
cussed later, did not use these provisions as it saw its 
power to recommend amnesty as being too limited to 
draw perpetrators in. Other countries have used TCs in 
amnesty processes, although none have given the power 
to a TC to grant amnesty, but simply to recommend. 
The SA TC amnesty model has not been used elsewhere 
because of  the problems in the process. South Africa’s 
amnesty process has been tainted by the fact that al-
most no prosecutions have occurred in the wake of  the 
process.48 This is because the system of  giving amnesty 
was sold to victims and to the country as a whole, many 
47  A.K. Krueger, The Global Diffusion of  Truth Commissions: 
An Integrative Approach to Diffusion as a Process of  Collective 
Learning, 45 Theory and Society 143-168 (2016) 155.
48  Jeremy Sarkin, “Dealing With Enforced Disappearances in 
South Africa (With a Focus on the Nokuthula Simelane case) and 
Around the World: The Need to Ensure Progress on the Rights to 
Truth, Justice and Reparations” Speculum Juris 1, (2015).
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of  whom were not happy that amnesty were to be gi-
ven, on the basis that prosecutions would occur after 
the process for those who did not apply or who were 
refused amnesty. The fact that prosecutions did not oc-
cur went against the pact that those who did not own 
up and give information would face the law. The fact 
that this did not occur has substantially undermined the 
South African amnesty process. It was also undermined 
by perceptions about how much new truth was obtai-
ned. Offenders were able to avoid giving the real truth, 
or avoid giving the full truth, because there was little in 
the way of  a verification process.
4. truth commissions With the poWer to 
recommend amnesty
The next section examines the TCs that have had 
the power to only recommend amnesty to the state, or 
to a specific arm of  the state, such as attorney gene-
rals or others. The distinction between the ability of  an 
institution to grant an amnesty versus the capability of  
simply making a recommendation is crucial. Generally, 
the authority to grant an amnesty or pardon is a power 
that states are unwilling to devolve to an institution that 
cannot be controlled politically. Thus, there is a tension 
between creating a TC that is independent, and then 
trusting that institution with the power to grant amnes-
ty. For this reason, there has been reluctance by gover-
nments to give to TCs, besides the South African TC, 
the power to directly give amnesty to perpetrators. Part 
of  the problem is that the model of  giving this power 
to TCs is somewhat tainted by the South African pro-
cess. Since the South African TC amnesty process there 
have been a number of  TCs that have only been given 
the authority to recommend amnesty. The next parts of  
this article evaluate how those models have worked in 
practice to determine what lessons can be ascertained.
4.1. Grenada
The first TC model considered with the power to 
recommend amnesty occurred in Grenada in 2001. The 
Grenadian TC was given the authority “[t]o recommend 
indemnity to various persons who give what is conside-
red to be truthful evidence at the enquiry.”49 The TC50 
deemed this to mean that witnesses could be “favou-
rably considered for the grant of  amnesty or exemp-
tion from prosecution.”51 It was however insufficient 
to tempt perpetrators into testifying about what crimes 
they had committed. The TC recognized that the inabi-
lity to directly provide some type of  immunity or am-
nesty was an obstacle to its effective functioning and in 
being able to elicit more truth. The TC in its final report 
thus noted: 
It is the belief  and understanding of  the 
Commission that there are persons who might have 
made themselves available to appear before it and 
testify if  they could have been given assurance of  
protection against prosecution; and that there were 
persons who appeared before the Commission and 
did give evidence, but were inhibited from speaking 
‘the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth’ for fear of  playing into the hands of  the 
prosecuting authorities.52 
Thus, it seems that the fact that uncertainty existed 
as to whether a person would be granted some type of  
legal protection undermined their willingness to enter 
the process. The fact that a perpetrator first had to give 
information and only later be considered for some type 
of  indemnity by the state seemed to have been too inde-
terminate, and risky for potential applicants.
4.2. Timor-Leste
The second example considered here of  a TC re-
commending amnesty, although again the process was 
to recommend immunity, was the Commission for Re-
ception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) TC process 
established in 2001 in Timor-Leste.53 It must be noted 
49  Grenada “Terms of  Reference of  the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission”, in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report 
on certain political events which occurred in Grenada 1976-1991, 28 March 
2006.
50  See further Geoff  Dancy, Hunjoon Kim and Eric Wiebelhaus-
Brahm, “The Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commission Experi-
mentation” Journal of  Human Rights, 9(1) (2010): 45-64.
51  Grenada “Terms of  Reference of  the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission”, in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report 
on certain political events which occurred in Grenada 1976-1991, 28 March 
2006.Volume 1 Part 7.
52  Grenada “Terms of  Reference of  the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission”, in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report 
on certain political events which occurred in Grenada 1976-1991, 28 March 
2006.Volume 1 Part 7.
53  Jeremy Sarkin, “Achieving Reconciliation in Divided Socie-
ties: Comparing the Approaches in Timor-Leste, South Africa and 
Rwanda” Yale Journal of  International Affairs 3(2); (2008): 11- 28.
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that there have been two TCs focused on Timor-Leste 
this one established by the UN Transitional Adminis-
tration in East Timor (UNTAET)54 and the Commis-
sion on Truth and Friendship (CTF) which was a joint 
TC established by Timor-Leste and Indonesia after the 
CAVR. The CTF amnesty process is considered below.
The CAVR process in Timor-Leste was mandated 
to: “inquire into human rights violations committed on 
all sides, between April 1974 and October 1999, and 
facilitate community reconciliation with justice for tho-
se who committed less serious offenses.” It provides, 
however, another example of  perpetrators not coming 
forward without being given a priori immunity or am-
nesty for their stated actions. A critical issue is that 
many of  the main perpetrators were not in the country 
but had fled to and were protected by Indonesia. 
By January 2004 the CAVR had taken 7,000 testimo-
nies, none of  which, however, came from perpetrators.55 
Part of  the reason for this was that the CAVR was not 
permitted to recommend or grant amnesty. However it 
had a Community Reconciliation Process (CRP)56 that 
sought to obtain the truth about what had occurred and 
achieve reconciliation, as well as to ensure the reinte-
gration of  perpetrators back into their communities.57 
It was meant to be “a cheaper, faster, less complicated 
process.”58 The process was established to permit a per-
son who went through this process successfully to be 
granted immunity from all civil or criminal liability.59 
The regulations initially provided that the Commission 
could not bring people that had committed “serious” 
offences into the CRP process. Crimes were defined as 
54  Patrick Burgess, “Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor: 
The Relationship Between the Commission for Reception, Truth 
and Reconciliation and the Courts” Criminal Law Forum 15; (2004): 
135-138.
55  Natalie Pierce, “Picking Up The Pieces: Truth and Justice in 
Sierra Leone”, New Zealand Journal of  Public and International Law 6(2), 
(2008) 117-156.
56  Padraig McAuliffe, “East Timor’s Community Reconciliation 
Process as a model for legal pluralism in criminal justice” Law, Social 
Justice and Global Development, 2, 12 (2008).
57  Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East 
Timor “Chega! The Final Report of  the Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor” (2005) in http://www.etan.
org/news/2006/cavr.htm
58  Patrick Burgess, “East Timor’s Community Reconciliation 
Process”, in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Be-
yond Truth versus Justice, Eds. Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Ma-
riezcurrena, (2006): 176-205, 184.
59  Chega!, Report of  the Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation for East Timor, (2006).
serious depending on their nature, how many had been 
committed and the specific role of  the perpetrator.60 
The regulations were later amended, because of  pro-
blems relating to the functioning of  the Office of  the 
General Prosecutor (OGP) and the debate around who 
should enter the CRP. The wording was changed so that 
“in principle” serious crimes could not fall within the 
mandate of  the CRP process. Thus, exceptions were 
permitted and some people who committed serious cri-
mes were allowed to apply.
To gain immunity, the person had to voluntarily sub-
mit a written declaration setting out in full detail what 
they had done, and how they were linked to the political 
conflict.61 The deponent then had to provide an oral 
version of  the deeds for which reconciliation was sou-
ght. The person had to admit responsibility and con-
duct an “Act of  Reconciliation” to get such immunity.62 
However, before this could occur the OGP had to de-
liberate on the case and approve it for CRP, rather than 
prosecution. After the hearing, if  there was concord on 
the application by all the various role-players, a Recon-
ciliation Agreement was drafted. After it was agreed to 
by a court of  law it become a Court Order and was 
therefore binding.
Interestingly, the Commission sent all 1,541 CRP 
statements that it received to the OGP, of  which 85 ca-
ses were refused by the GP.63 Each of  the 85 cases that 
were refused by the GP involved low-level perpetrators 
who provided detailed statements to the CAVR without 
any legal advice and without legal protection.64 There 
was no mechanism whereby if  they were not integrated 
via the CRP, that the information they provided would 
not be used against them in the eventuality of  a pro-
secution.65 These individuals seemingly believed that 
60  Natalie Pierce, “Picking Up The Pieces: Truth and Justice in 
Sierra Leone”, New Zealand Journal of  Public and International 
Law 6(2), (2008) 117-156, 147.
61  Padraig McAuliffe, East Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process 
as a model for legal pluralism in criminal justice, 9.
62  Spencer Zifcak, “Restorative Justice in East Timor: An Evalu-
ation of  the Community Reconciliation Process of  the CAVR” Asia 
Foundation, 2004.
63  Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East 
Timor “Chega! The Final Report of  the Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor” (2005) 
64  Patrick Burgess, “East Timor’s Community Reconciliation 
Process”, in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth 
versus Justice, Eds. Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena, 
(2006): 176-205, 195-196.
65  Alison Bisset, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in 
Truth Commission-Administered Accountability Initiatives.” Leiden 
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they did not need such protection, as they would not 
be prosecuted because they had entered the reintegra-
tion process. It was only the fact that there was a large 
caseload that saw those cases not being taken up by the 
prosecutors.66 However, there is an anomalous situa-
tion, as discussed below, that these people were given 
no protection against self-incrimination, which was the 
case for those persons who were subpoenaed to appear 
before the CAVR.67
Hearings were held for the applicants in 1,371 ca-
ses. Again, no protection was provided to insulate them 
from what they testified to at the hearings. It seems that 
all those who testified believed that they would be get-
ting amnesty. However, during the proceedings 32 cases 
were interrupted because, according to the Chega Re-
port, credible information was received that the appli-
cant may have committed a “serious criminal offence,” 
or because the community would not go along with the 
request for immunity.68 Overall, nearly 90 percent of  all 
cases ended up with immunity. The remaining 10 per-
cent (170 cases) did not end with a positive granting of  
immunity because the applicant did not appear at their 
hearing, problems were raised at the hearing, or because 
the GP did not agree to the case continuing through 
this process.69 
As far as the outcome of  the process as a whole is 
concerned both McAuliffe and Burgess argue that the 
CRP was very successful.70 Pigou found that “there is a 
widespread feeling that the CRPs have definitely contri-
buted to building social cohesion and relieving tensions 
in many places.”71 However, Burgess makes it clear that it 
is difficult to draw lessons from the CRP because it was 
designed and operated in the local context.72 Regardless, 
a 90 percent success rate for those who entered the pro-
cess is very high. It is, however necessary to understand 
the reasons for this. It must be recognised that the bulk 
Journal of  International Law 30(1) (2017): 155-176, 160.
66  Chega!, Part 9, para. 169.
67  Alison Bisset, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in 
Truth Commission-Administered Accountability Initiatives.” Leiden 
Journal of  International Law 30.1 (2017): 160.
68  Chega Part 9, para.102.
69  Chega Part 9, para.102.
70  McAuliffe, East Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process as a model 
for legal pluralism in criminal justice and Burgess, East Timor’s Community 
Reconciliation Process, 176.
71  Piers Pigou, “The Community Reconciliation Process of  the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation”, UN Devel-
opment Programme, (2004): 84.
72  Burgess, 176.
of  the architects of  the violence, and many of  the high 
level, and even some at the lower level, perpetrators 
were not in the country. They were in Indonesia and as 
a result, most of  the people who applied were people 
who were involved in the violence, but not at leadership 
levels. Also Timor-Leste is small and most of  the actors 
involved in the violence were known. The perpetrators 
continued to live amongst their victims. This makes it 
easier to understand the high rate of  community recon-
ciliation efforts as well as the willingness to reintegrate 
many of  these people. They were part of  the commu-
nity, and there were no specific divisions or schisms be-
tween them and their communities. However, it must be 
noted that there were “in excess of  3,000 perpetrators” 
in Timor-Leste, who did not enter the process. This was 
largely because they did not know about the CRP, did 
not understand it, and by the time they found out about 
it the time for applications had passed.73 A lesson, there-
fore, is that education around such processes and their 
benefits enhances participation.
Still, the relatively high numbers of  applications, 
1,371 persons - compared to other processes where 
TCs had powers only to recommend amnesty - must be 
understood in the context of  what else was happening 
in Timor-Leste at the time. As noted earlier, people ap-
ply for amnesty if  they believe they need it. They do 
so because they believe that it is likely that they could 
be prosecuted otherwise. This was the case in Timor-
-Leste, as the Special Panels of  the Dili District Court 
had already been established in 2000 by UNTAET to 
prosecute such offences.74 
The fact that Timor-Leste was being administered 
by the UN and the Security Council had already adop-
ted, in 1999, Resolution 1272 which ordered that “those 
responsible for such violence be brought to justice”75, 
was a clear sign to perpetrators that the political will to 
prosecute offenders existed. This view was cemented 
when the special Panels were created. This hybrid court 
process was already handing down verdicts in Decem-
ber 2001. 
A critical issue in this process, similar to the one in 
Sierra-Leone, was the timing and sequencing of  the 
73  Burgess, 196
74  Suzanne Katzenstein, “Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice 
in East Timor”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 16. (2003):245-278.
75  Taina Jaervinen, “Human Rights and Post-Conflict Transition-
al Justice in East Timor”, UPI Working Papers 47, Finnish Institute of  
International Affairs, (2004): 51.
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process. In Timor-Leste, the timing was important as 
the CAVR began its work formally in July 2001 and en-
ded its work on December 20, 2005.76 When the CAVR 
began its work, prosecutions before the courts were al-
ready in full swing, so at least some perpetrators knew 
that prosecutions were occurring and that they could be 
put on trial. This knowledge is cemented by the fact that 
by the end of  2003, 367 people had already been char-
ged with crimes, 84 percent of  them being indicted for 
crimes against humanity. By then, there were already 38 
convictions (all East-Timorese), for crimes against hu-
manity and other serious crimes.77 These prosecutions, 
and the types of  charges levelled, gave perpetrators, 
who lived in Timor-Leste the sense that they needed 
amnesty. For those who knew about the CRP and un-
derstood what it was about they were more likely to ap-
ply for amnesty. However, there was uncertainty about 
the process and a cultural belief  about the shame asso-
ciated with admitting to involvement in such crimes. It 
took a concerted outreach campaign to get people into 
the process.78 However, the outreach campaign was not 
as useful as it could have been as, by the end of  the pro-
cess there were still many people who had not heard of  
it or did not understand it if  they had been made aware 
of  its existence.79
In many ways, this process was a conditional am-
nesty. People got immunity/amnesty in exchange for 
truth and reconciliation. It has been noted that this pro-
cess provided much truth which otherwise would not 
have been known80 and that it also provided “symbolic 
closure.”81 
It must be noted that then Prime Minister Xanana 
76  Patrick Burgess and Galuh Wandita, “Reaching Out to Vic-
tims and Communities: The CAVR’s Experiences in Timor-Leste,” 
in Transitional Justice, Culture, and Society: Beyond Outreach, Ed. Ramirez-
Barat (Colombia University Press, 2014). 143.
77  Taina Jaervinen, “Human Rights and Post-Conflict Transition-
al Justice in East Timor”, UPI Working Papers 47, Finnish Institute 
of  International Affairs, (2004): 51. 
78  Patrick Burgess and Galuh Wandita, “Reaching Out to Vic-
tims and Communities: The CAVR’s Experiences in Timor-Leste,” 
in Transitional Justice, Culture, and Society: Beyond Outreach, Ed. Ramirez-
Barat (Colombia University Press, 2014):156.
79  Patrick Burgess and Galuh Wandita, “Reaching Out to Vic-
tims and Communities: The CAVR’s Experiences in Timor-Leste,” 
in Transitional Justice, Culture, and Society: Beyond Outreach, Ed. 
Ramirez-Barat (Colombia University Press, 2014). 143.
80  Piers Pigou, The Community Reconciliation Process of  the Commission 
for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation.
81  Padraig McAuliffe, East Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process 
as a model for legal pluralism in criminal justice, 10.
Gusmão proposed an amnesty law in 2001. After he be-
came President of  the country such a law was drafted 
and presented to the Parliament. 82 However, it was not 
adopted.
As far as powers to get information from perpetra-
tors were concerned, the CAVR had both search and 
seizure,83 and subpoena powers. As far as subpoena 
powers are concerned, the law entitled the CAVR to 
compel individuals to appear and had to answer, under 
oath, questions that were put to them.84 They were pro-
tected in the sense that there could be no compulsion 
to give evidence that was self-incriminating or would 
implicate a close relative.85
Thus, the CAVR process and its outcomes must be 
seen to be very context specific. However, much can be 
learnt from these processes, which can then be imple-
mented into processes that may be established in the fu-
ture. All circumstances and their potential effects need 
to be considered when a process is started. However, 
linking processes of  amnesty to reconciliation seems to 
have been somewhat successful.
4.3. Indonesia–Timor-Leste Commission on 
Truth and Friendship (CTF) 
The third example of  a TC’s involvement with am-
nesty is that of  the Indonesia–Timor-Leste Commis-
sion on Truth and Friendship (CTF) established in 
2005. The CTF was jointly established by Timor-Leste 
and Indonesia to deal with crimes committed in Timor-
-Leste around Timor-Leste’s independence. 
The CTF Commission was given the authority to ‘re-
commend amnesty for those involved in human rights 
violations who cooperate fully in revealing the truth’.86 
The terms of  reference given to the CTF provided that 
amnesty would be given to those: involved in human 
rights violations if  they fully cooperated in establishing 
the truth. The CTF in its report noted that amnesty 
would only have been recommended if  considerable 
assistance was provided to the CTF in finding the truth 
and if  the person appeared before the Commission and 
82  Taina Jaervinen, “Human Rights and Post-Conflict Transition-
al Justice in East Timor”, UPI Working Papers 47, Finnish Institute 
of  International Affairs, (2004): 64.
83  Section 15.
84  UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/10 s. 14.1(c).
85  Section 17.
86  UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/10 S. 14, ss c, i-iv.
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admitted their role and responsibility in the incidents.87 
However, no person was given amnesty.88 The CTF Re-
port, “Per Memoriam ad Spem”, notes that the Com-
mission did not recommend “amnesty or rehabilitation 
for any persons.”89 This is because perpetrators largely 
ignored the process and did not participate. Even clo-
sed hearings, and the fact that hearings took place in In-
donesia did not sufficiently tempt perpetrators to come 
forward. Relatively few people participated in process 
in general. The CTF report notes that the Commission 
was able to collect statements and interviews from 108 
out of  a total number of  280 individuals it had identi-
fied as potential witnesses,90 composed of  victims, wit-
nesses and perpetrators. However, only 62 people gave 
testimony to the CTF. The list of  names published in 
the Report, shows that the 62 people who testified were 
collectively victims, witnesses and perpetrators. Very 
few of  the 62 were perpetrators, even though some of  
the hearings were held in Indonesia, and many were 
closed to the public. In fact, closed hearings were held 
five times in Indonesia and three times in Timor-Leste. 
Even closed hearings, and the fact that hearings took 
place in Indonesia did not sufficiently tempt perpetra-
tors to come forward.
The Commission notes in its Report that no amnes-
ties were recommended. The CTF found that no per-
petrators met the standard that the commission had set 
for recommending a person for amnesty: attending a 
public hearing, telling the complete truth and providing 
full cooperation.91 Thus, it seems as though coopera-
tion with the commission by perpetrators did not occur. 
This is probably the case, as perpetrators might have 
believed that they had no reason to cooperate. They 
were probably of  the view that there were unlikely to be 
prosecutions, particularly in Indonesia where the bulk 
of  perpetrators originated. There is also the chance that 
they did not cooperate because no amnesty was assured. 
They undoubtedly saw that amnesty was not guaran-
teed, as the commission had no power to grant amnesty, 
but was simply empowered to make recommendations 
87  Cited by Renée Jeffery in “Trading amnesty for impunity in 
Timor-Leste” Conflict, Security & Development 16 (1) (2016):199.
88  Jefferey, Trading amnesty for impunity in Timor-Leste 199.
89  Commission on Truth and Friendship Per Memoriam Ad 
Spem (‘Through Memory to Hope’), Xviii
90  Commission on Truth and Friendship Per Memoriam Ad 
Spem (‘Through Memory to Hope’), 28.
91  Commission on Truth and Friendship Per Memoriam Ad 
Spem (‘Through Memory to Hope’), 296. 
about the granting of  amnesty. Perpetrators must have 
calculated that they had a lot to lose by coming forward, 
and very little, if  anything, to gain from participating in 
the CTF process.
4.4. Liberia
The fourth TC amnesty-recommending model con-
sidered is that which occurred in Liberia from 2005.92 
In Liberia93 the law establishing the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission,94 provided that the TC could re-
commend:
amnesty under terms and conditions established 
by the TC upon application of  individual persons 
making full disclosures of  their wrongs and thereby 
expressing remorse for their acts and/or omissions, 
whether as an accomplice or a perpetrator, provided 
that amnesty or exoneration shall not apply to 
violations of  international law ad crimes against 
humanity in conformity with international laws and 
standards.
It was widely believed in the country that this model 
was adapted from the South African process. However 
these provisions are very different from the South Afri-
can version as it only allowed recommendations to be 
made concerning amnesty.95 The Liberian version also 
limited the crimes available for amnesty to those that 
are not considered serious international crimes.96 This 
was not the case in South Africa where any crime was 
available to be amnestied. The Liberian TC’s Rules of  
Procedure stated that:
Every witness seeking immunity from prosecution 
or tort actions on account of  statements made or 
evidence given before the Commission pursuant to 
Article VII, Section 30 of  the TC Act, shall make 
a formal application for such immunity and give 
reasons for such a request in order to enable the 
92  On the development of  the TJ model in Liberia see Hayner, 
Priscilla B., and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. “Negotiating 
peace in Liberia: preserving the possibility for justice”. Geneva: HD 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2007.
93  Ezekiel Pajibo, “Civil Society and Transitional Justice in Libe-
ria: A Practitioner’s Reflection from the Field.” International Journal of  
Transitional Justice 2(1) (2007): 287-296.
94  Liberia, An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TC) of  Liberia, 10 June 2005.
95  Ozonnia Ojielo, “Critical lessons in post-conflict security in 
Africa: the case of  Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission” 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2010.
96  Rosalia De la Cruz Gitau, “God willing, I will be back’: Gaug-
ing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s capacity to deter 
economic crimes in Liberia”, African Security Review, 17(4) (2008): 
64-78.
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Commission to make a decision on whether or not 
to grant the immunity requested.97
To persuade people to come before the TC, the ins-
titution published the names of  198 persons it believed, 
from testimonies the institution had already received, 
were responsible for committing various violations.98 It 
named another 139 people as “persons of  interest”.99 In 
its final report, it named 182 people that it was recom-
mending for prosecution. The commission did recom-
mend a general amnesty to be given to children who 
had committed offenses, and that amnesty be made 
available for non-serious crimes to promote national 
healing and reconciliation if  people admitted what they 
had done and expressed repentance.100 
As far as providing amnesty to specific people is 
concerned, the Liberia TC recommended that: “all indi-
viduals who admitted their wrongs and spoke truthfully 
before or to the TC as an expression of  remorse will 
not be recommended for prosecution.” It named 38 
people it recommended to receive amnesty out of  a to-
tal of  17,000 people who testified before the commis-
sion.101 Thus, it seems as though few perpetrators came 
forward considering that nearly 150,000 people were 
killed and tens of  thousands of  violations were com-
mitted.102 Those who came forward seem to have feared 
prosecution because at least some of  their names were 
on the lists that were published by the TC during its 
existence. Those lists seem to have induced a few per-
petrators to come forward. They may have believed that 
because they had been publically ousted, they should 
risk testifying to potentially be recommended for am-
nesty. Despite this, it does seem as though that the vast 
majority of  perpetrators were not actually prepared to 
testify without amnesty.
97  Rule 47 adapted from Section 30 of  the Liberian TC Act.
98 Amnesty International Public Statement. AI Index: AFR 
34/010/2008. Liberia: Will those investigated by the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission ever be prosecuted? (2008)
99  Paul James-Allen; Aaron Weah and Lizzie Goodfriend, “Be-
yond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice 
Options in Liberia” (New York: International Center for Transitional 
Justice, 2010).
100  Liberia TC Report Volume 2 page 8.
101  See Aaron Weah, “Hopes and Uncertainties: Liberia’s Journey 
to End Impunity” International Journal of  Transitional Justice 6(2), 
(2012):331-343.
102  Julie A. Keil, “Liberia’s TC: The road to rule of  law or a dead 
end?.” African Journal of  Political Science and International Relations 11(8), 
(2017): 201-209.
4.5. The Kenyan Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)
In Kenya, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC) was established in 2008, in the 
wake of  the 2007/2008 post-election violence, which 
racked the country along ethnic lines.103 The violence 
erupted in the country after Mwai Kibaki was named 
the victor of  the presidential election, and his electoral 
opponent, Raila Odinga alleged electoral fraud. More 
than 1300 people were killed in the violence.
A parliamentary statute, the Truth Justice and Re-
conciliation Commission Act, created the TJRC.104 Whi-
le it was established as a result of  a peace agreement 
after the electoral violence, the National Accord, the TC 
was not established to deal solely with that period. In 
fact, it was mandated to investigate the gross human 
rights violations and other historical injustices in Kenya 
between 12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008. 
One of  its major goals was to gain as much truth about 
the violations in the mandated period as possible. The 
TJRC was instructed to establish a precise, comprehen-
sive and historical record of  the human rights abuses 
committed during that period. 
To enhance truth recovery the TJRC Act contained 
various provisions to persuade those with information 
to be more forthcoming. A useful provision to try and 
encourage people to participate and provide informa-
tion was a provision that there could not be criminal 
or civil proceedings or a penalty or forfeiture for any 
information or evidence given by a person in the pro-
ceedings.105 The TJRC was also given powers to recom-
mend amnesty to perpetrators who cooperated with it 
in its quest for the truth.106 Initially, the TJRC was given 
free reign to decide on the types of  crimes for which 
amnesty could be recommended, before approaching 
the Attorney General.107 Later, the law was amended to 
narrow down the crimes for which amnesty could be re-
commended. The Act was very detailed concerning the 
amnesty process. Much of  the Act follows the South 
African legislation with many parts being copied exac-
103  Evelyne Asaala, “Exploring transitional justice as a vehicle for 
social and political transformation in Kenya.” African Human Rights 
Law Journal 10(2), (2010): 377-406.
104  No. 6 of  2008.
105  Section 24(3) of  the TJRC Act.
106  Section 34 of  the TJRC Act.
107  Kenya, The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act 6 of  2008, 
28 November 2008.
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tly. However, the negative aspects of  the South African 
process, which reduced its efficacy, had also been repli-
cated. Thus, the South African process had not been su-
fficiently understood and similar provisions were incor-
porated which had similar negative effects. The onerous 
and complex legal criteria of  the South African process, 
which had been duplicated, also could have reduced the 
numbers of  applicants. Thus, the Kenyan TJRC amnes-
ty process was very detailed and the criteria to be met by 
applicants were very comprehensive.
The law determined that applications for amnesty 
had to be in writing, had to comply with the Act and 
that there had to be full disclosure.108 The TJRC was 
entitled to hold hearings on amnesty applications.109 As 
with the South African process, the burdensome, com-
plex and extensive criteria of  the TJRC process probably 
had the effect of  reducing the number of  perpetrators 
who viewed the process in a positive light and who were 
willing to navigate its course. However, once again, the 
biggest problem with the TJRC amnesty process was 
that the institution only had the power to recommend 
amnesty, and not grant it. This was not something that 
perpetrators saw as credible. They were seemingly re-
luctant to rely on the power given to the TC to make 
recommendations. Ronald Slye, one of  the international 
commissioners on the TJRC, has noted that because the 
commission could only recommend amnesty: 
“The weakened provisions effectively nullified any 
impact of  amnesty in the Kenyan process, while at 
the same time providing the mistaken perception 
that the Kenyan Commission had controversial 
amnesty powers…”110 
Slye notes further, that the “powers of  the Kenyan 
Commission were so severely limited that they were 
unavailable as a tool for the Commission to use to 
entice perpetrator testimony or foster reconciliation.” 
Thus, it seems that few perpetrators were willing to 
avail themselves of  the supposed benefits of  amnesty. 
In this regard, the TJR noted in its final Report that it 
had decided not to exercise its powers to recommend 
amnesty.111 It states that it did this because it believed 
108  Section 38.
109  Section 36.
110  Ronald C. Slye, “Putting the J into the TC: Kenya’s Truth 
Commission: Forthcoming in Twenty Years On: Other Ways of  Be-
ing and the South African Truth Reconciliation Commission”, Seattle 
University School of  Law Research Paper, 17(08), (2017):26.
111  Truth, Justice & Reconciliation Commission, “The Final Re-
port of  the Truth, Justice & Reconciliation Commission of  Kenya” 
(2013), http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/tjrc/1
that few crimes would fit into the scope of  what was 
envisaged, but more importantly it argued that: “the fact 
that it could only recommend and not grant amnesty, 
the Commission did not anticipate that much additional 
truth would come out of  the amnesty process.” Thus, 
the Commission noted that its powers to recommend 
amnesty alone was not something that was useful to it 
in the exercise of  its mandate. In fact, the TJRC notes 
in its final Report that the limited amnesty powers given 
to it were not useful to it in gaining truth.112
4.6. Republic of Korea
Various attempts to deal with Korea’s past have 
been attempted over the last seven or so decades. 
Some suggest that since 1996 there have been some ei-
ghteen TCs.113 This article will only deal with the most 
comprehensive and influential of  those efforts:114 the 
2005115 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  Korea 
(TCK).116 It was tasked to investigate the period 1910 to 
1993.117 The focus is also on the amnesty process and 
extent to which it benefitted truth recovery.
The TCK Act gave the Commission the authority to 
recommend ‘immunity’ to those who cooperated with 
it.118 Article 30 provides that a person “who obtains or 
submits critical materials for clearing up the truth in 
the investigation, and may recommend he/she be gran-
ted amnesty.”119 Article 38 (Reconciliation for Victimi-
zer Cooperating with the Investigation) provided that 
a perpetrator who actively cooperated and confessed 
their crimes could get the TCK to recommend immu-
nity or the mitigation of  punishment. The TCK could 
also recommend to the President that a pardon or exo-
neration be given.
112  TJRC Report Volume 1, paragraph 125.
113  Tae-Ung Baik. “Fairness in Transitional Justice Initiatives: 
The Case of  South Korea.” Buffalo Human Rights Law Review. 19 
(2012):169, 170.
114  Andrew Wolman, “Looking Back While Moving Forward: 
The Evolution of  Truth Commissions in Korea.” Asian-Pacific Law 
& Policy Journal 14(3), (2012): 27.
115  Ibid.
116  Framework Act on Clearing Up Past Incidents for Truth and 
Reconciliation by Law No. 7542, May 31, 2005.
117  Tara J. Melish, “Implementing Truth and Reconciliation: 
Comparative Lessons for the Republic of  Korea.” Buffalo Human 
Rights law Review. 19 (2012):1.
118  Art. 38.
119  Republic of  Korea TC, Truth and Reconciliation Activities 
of  the Past Three Years (2009):123.
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These powers were similar to that which the earlier 
Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths, 
established in 2000, had sought to establish. It seems as 
though neither process saw the recommendatory func-
tion as useful. As a result of  the 2005 Commission, only 
having the power to recommend immunity/ amnesty to 
other state actors, few perpetrators were willing to come 
forward and few were willing to work with the TCK.120 
Dong-Choon has noted that: “few veterans have been 
willing to come forward.”121 The power to subpoena 
people was available, but the Commission had limited 
powers to compel compliance and little sanctioning 
power to use against those who did not comply.122 It has 
been found that “the TCK rarely issued an order com-
pelling a person to appear before it and never penalised 
anyone for refusing to appear before it.123
Thus, it seems that, as with the other TC processes, 
giving a TC the power to recommend amnesty does not 
achieve positive results unless the process is delineated 
carefully and publicised widely, as occurred in Timor-
-Leste. It must also be noted that if  a TC is against such 
provisions and does not possess the will to implement 
them then the process is doomed from the start. Far 
more ought to be done to educate those in such pro-
cesses about the benefits of  these processes. However, 
because amnesty provisions are often criticised, much 
needs to be done during the drafting phase of  TC legis-
lation to craft a law that contains useful provisions. But, 
there also needs to be sufficient consultation and edu-
cation on these provisions to garner support for them, 
in order to eliminate negative perceptions when the TC 
begins its work.
5. other tc amnesty processes
A number of  other similar TCs have occurred 
around the world that had amnesty powers. These will 
not yet been analysed in much depth because they have 
not come to fruition, or have not yet terminated.
As with the other TCs that had powers of  amnes-
ty, the Democratic Republic of  Congo (DRC) was only 
120  Dong-Choon Kim, “Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission: An Overview and Assessment.” Buffalo Human Rights 
Law Review 19 (2012): 97, 107.
121  Ibid.
122  Ibid.
123  Ibid.
able to recommend amnesty.124 The TC was established 
as a constitutional mechanism in the 2003 Constitution 
of  the Transition.125 The law established that it had to 
deal with matters between 1960 and 2006. It was man-
dated to ‘establish truth and to promote peace, justice, 
reparation, forgiveness and reconciliation for sustaining 
national unity.’126 However, the TC did not investigate 
any cases and made no recommendations about the 
granting of  amnesty.127 A proposal for a subsequent 
TC, recommended that it “receive all demands for am-
nesty, examine their legitimacy, and grant or refuse it.” 
128 In other words, the TC should be given the power 
to grant amnesty and not simply recommend it, as had 
been the case previously. This suggests that the TC saw 
the power to recommend amnesty only as of  limited 
value and therefore was suggesting that for amnesty to 
have effect the TC needed to have the power to actually 
grant amnesty.
Another TC that was to have amnesty provisions 
was that created by a law in Indonesia in 2004 to deal 
with crimes that had occurred there. The law provided 
that the institution would be able to receive confessions 
and apologies, and then recommend to the President of  
the country which persons would be given amnesty.129 
Because the Constitutional Court of  Indonesia in 2006 
ruled that the statute was incompatible with the 1945 
Constitution,130 the TC was never established. Thus, lit-
tle can be learnt from this example other than it being 
an example of  a model where truth was to be traded 
for amnesty.
In Nepal, an early draft of  a TC law in 2007 con-
tained a provision that the institution would have had 
the power to recommend amnesty if  the perpetrator 
applied for it and submitted an amnesty application 
124  Loi No. /04/018 du Juillet 30 2004 portant sur l’organisation, 
attributions et fonctionnement de la Commission Vérité et 
Réconciliation, article 8g.
125  Constitution of  the Transition, article 154 (2003).
126  Olivier Kambala and Tyrone Savage, Decayed, Decimated, 
Usurped and Inadequate: the Challenge of  Finding Justice through Formal 
Mechanisms in the DR Congo, Ivo Aertsen et al., “Restoring Justice af-
ter Large-Scale Violent Conflicts”, (Cullompton and Portland, Wil-
lan Publishing; Devon, U.K. 2008): 346.
127  Laura Davis and Priscilla Hayner “Difficult Peace, Limited 
Justice: Ten Years of
Peacemaking in the DRC”, International Centre for Transitional Justice, 
(2009):22.
128  Ibid, 23.
129  Indonesia, Law No 27, 6 October 2004.
130  Constitutional Court of  the Republic of  Indonesia, Decision 
No 020/PUU-IV/2006.
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“in course of  abiding by his/her duties or with the 
objective of  fulfilling political motives” and had also 
expressed regret.131 The Commission on Investigation 
of  Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation Act, 
(2014), has the authority to make recommendations 
for amnesty to the Government of  Nepal,132 but also 
to make recommendations for legal action to be taken 
against perpetrators that are not given amnesty.133 The 
law does not state how the government is meant to de-
termine whether to grant the amnesty or not. The law 
simply states that “If  an amnesty is granted by the Go-
vernment of  Nepal to the person recommended by the 
Commission for amnesty pursuant to sub-section (1), 
the name of  such a person shall be published in the 
Nepal Gazette.”134 
The law states that the views of  the victim are su-
pposed to be considered before a decision is taken.135 
The Commission may cause “reasonable compensa-
tion” to be paid to the victim.136 The fact that the per-
petrators will not receive protection against having the 
information they give being used against them if  they 
are denied amnesty may be seen as a reason why po-
tential applicants do not enter the process. They may 
fear that if  they are not recommended for amnesty then 
the information they have incriminated themselves with 
may be used against them.
The law seems to suggest that there are limits as 
to when the institutions can recommend amnesty, for 
example, for serious offences. Nonetheless, in reality 
there seem to be ways around such limitations.137 Sec-
tion 26 (2) provides: “Notwithstanding anything contai-
ned in sub-section (1), the Commission may not make 
recommendation for amnesty in the case of  the per-
petrator who was involved in rape and who was invol-
ved in other offence of  grave nature, where sufficient 
ground and reason are not found to grant amnesty 
from the investigation of  the Commission.” The Com-
mission can, nevertheless, recommend amnesty if  they 
believe there are sufficient grounds or reasons.
131  ICTJ Challenging the Conventional Can Truth Commissions 
Strengthen Peace Processes? 2016 76-77.
132  Article 26(1).
133  Section 13(e).
134  Article 26(8).
135  Article 26(5).
136  Section 26(7).
137  Frank Ginsbach, “The Prosecution of  Human Rights Abuses 
in Neapal: A Himalayan Perspective on Truth and Reconciliation” 
Creighton International & Comparative Law Journal, 5 (2013): 25.
The law determines that applicants for amnesty must 
make complete, written admissions of  their past crimes 
and accept that they have committed gross violations of  
human rights. They must also apologise for what they 
have done to the victim and make a commitment not 
to repeat such offences.138 No protection is available to 
applicants if  they are refused amnesty as the law deter-
mines that the information given to the Commission is 
to be given to other institutions and that the TC must 
cooperate with other bodies.139 
The Supreme Court of  Nepal has struck down parts 
of  the amnesty provisions. This is because of  their in-
compatibility with Nepali law, as well as international 
law, partly because the statute permits serious crimes 
to be amnestied. The law has not yet been redrafted. 
At the time of  this article, the two Commissions have 
encountered many difficulties and have not made much 
progress. In part, this is because the law concerning the 
amnesty provisions had not been redrafted, so how it 
was supposed to work remains unknown. The Com-
missions seemingly have no policy or process to deci-
de whom to recommend for amnesty. There is no such 
committee and no preliminary action to begin these 
proceedings. In the current structure of  the TC, there 
is an amnesty division under its Reconciliation Unit that 
consists of  only three staff  members. However, it was 
vacant for a period because the government deployed 
these officials to oversee the electoral process. Because 
of  this, and the lack of  clarity on the process, no per-
petrator has yet applied for amnesty. The Commissions 
are now stalling because of  a lack of  human, technical 
and financial resources, and the proposed amendments 
to the law have not been tabled.
 In Burundi after a long period of  unrest a TC was 
established to investigate serious human rights viola-
tions committed from 1962 to 2008. It was mandated 
to investigate a range of  violations including killings, 
torture, enforced disappearances, deaths in custody and 
political assassinations. The amnesty task given to the 
Commission140 was to determine for which ‘political 
crimes’ an amnesty law could be adopted.141 The Com-
138  s. 26(3) and (4).
139  Alison Bisset, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in 
Truth Commission-Administered Accountability Initiatives.” Leiden 
Journal of  International Law 30(1) (2017):155-176.
140  David Taylor, “We have no influence’: International discourse 
and the Instrumentalisation of  Transitional Justice in Burundi”, Sta-
bility: International Journal of  Security & Development, 3(2), (2013):1–10.
141  Stef  Vandeginste, “Bypassing the prohibition of  amnesty for 
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mission, while established in law, was never actually 
established. As a result the provision was never acted 
on.142 The Commission’s charter contains provisions for 
individual amnesty procedures if  it is satisfied that the 
applicant has made full disclosure of  all relevant facts.
In Colombia, processes to grant conditional amnes-
ties or pardons are under way as a result of  the peace 
agreement between the Government and the FARC.143 
The Peace Agreement establishes the Comprehensive 
System of  Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repeti-
tion that has five strands, including the provision of  am-
nesty and pardon. Provided for is the Commission for 
the Identification of  the Truth, Coexistence and Non-
-Repetition.144 This truth commission does not have the 
power to grant amnesty.145 It will have subpoena powers 
to get people to testify before it but the evidence it ga-
thers may not be used in a criminal trial. The Commis-
sion has a three-year mandate to investigate and report 
on the violations committed during the conflict.
The power to grant conditional amnesty or pardon 
in Colombia is given to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace 
(SJP). It will also have authority to investigate, establish 
facts, and impose penalties.146 The SJP is comprised of  a 
number of  institutions, including a Trial Division in the 
event of  acknowledgement of  truth and responsibility, 
a Trial Division in the absence of  acknowledgement of  
truth and responsibility, the Judgment Review Division, 
the Stability and Compliance Division and the Tribu-
nal for Peace. The SJP can grant amnesty. However, it 
can also decide to waive criminal prosecutions, but the 
extent to which this can occur is unclear. Perpetrators, 
who have carried out politically associated crimes, that 
confess will get “special treatment” by the SJP if  va-
rious verified conditions are met. The conditions to be 
human rights crimes under international law: lessons learned from 
the Burundi peace process.” Netherlands Quarterly of  Human Rights 29 
(2011): 189, 200.
142  Stef  Vandeginste, “Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission: How to shed light on the Past while Standing in the Dark 
Shadow of  Politics?” International Journal of  Transitional Justice (2012): 
355-65.
143  Final Agreement to End the Conflict and Establish a Stable 
and Long-lasting Peace, Colombian Government.-FARC, Nov. 24, 
2016.
144  Bustamante-Reyes, J. (2017). Colombia’s path to peace. New 
Zealand International Review, 42(1), 14.
145  Ortiz Acosta, I. M. (2017). Seeking Truth in Colombia: Per-
spectives on a Truth Commission. Razón Crítica, 2, 21-50,
146  Due Process of  Law Foundation The Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace in Colombia: Recommendations for the Selection of  Judges 
of  the Chambers and Divisions of  the Tribunal for Peace 
met include providing truth to victims, acknowledging 
responsibility, participation in reparations programmes 
and provide guarantees of  non-repetition. Perpetrators 
who confessed to their crimes will not have to serve pri-
son time but will have their “place of  residence” deter-
mined by the Peace Tribunal.147 They will also be subject 
to “effective restrictions on freedoms and rights” whilst 
performing community service.148 However what the 
“place of  residence” will be and how much time they 
will have to be there each day, or what and how extensi-
ve the restrictions on their freedoms and rights will be, 
was not delineated in a 2017 draft of  the law. Perpetra-
tors from the security forces will have to be resident in 
military units but again what this means is not stated. 
While the law provides that sanctions can be reduced 
if  involvement in reparations activities occur it is not 
stated how this occurs or what those reductions can be. 
By August 2017 1,502 state security officials and 2,817 
FARC fighters had indicated that they wanted to go 
through the SJP process.149 How the process will work 
and what its effects and outcomes will be remain to be 
determined.
Thus a number of  other processes have been esta-
blished that affect the role that truth commissions play 
concerning amnesty. Some of  them never came to frui-
tion and some of  them are still in formation today so 
how they will work and what the role of  the TC will be 
is unclear.
6. conclusion
The use and extent of  TC amnesties around the 
world show that they continue to be a popular tool. 
They have an enormous number of  roles. They can 
play important functions in transitional societies. They 
can have the effect of  stopping a conflict if  all parties 
accept and buy into such an arrangement. While am-
nesties are usually viewed as problematic, they can have 
beneficial effects. Amnesties can play a symbiotic role 
with and be beneficial to TCs in their truth recovery 
147  Proyecto de ley Estatutaria de la Administración de Justicia en 
la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz), bill no. 8/2017.
148  Josi, Claudia. «Accountability in the Colombian Peace Agree-
ment: Are the Proposed Sanctions Contrary to Colombia’s Interna-
tional Obligations.» Southwestern Law. Review. 46 (2016): 401.
149  El Espectador: Las incógnitas de la Justicia Especial para la 
Paz, 22 August 2017
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processes. However, this is dependent on the way the 
amnesty process is structured to begin with, and the 
way it is carried out.
Giving perpetrators amnesty can be beneficial for 
truth recovery processes because these persons have 
much to reveal about the events that occurred. Howe-
ver, perpetrators do not usually participate in the pro-
cesses of  search for truth out of  fear that the weight of  
the law will be brought against them. They are usually 
not willing to participate in the proceedings if  they 
do not obtain guarantees of  protection against being 
prosecuted. Thus, tools such as amnesties can be very 
useful for truth-seeking processes. Truth commissions 
largely take into account the narratives of  the testimony 
of  the victims, without taking into account the voices 
of  other actors involved in the conflict.150 However, 
victims do not have many specific facts to tell when it 
comes to events that occurred outside the specific si-
tuation in which they were involved. Instead, learning 
from direct testimonies given by perpetrators would cla-
rify many more situations. For example, past offenders 
could reveal who ordered, organised, was involved, pre-
pared, and executed certain abuses. Usually, these mat-
ters remain unknown or only known to a very limited 
extent and then, to very few people. 
All the TC processes recommending amnesty dis-
cussed in this article including Grenada, Indonesia, the 
Democratic Republic of  the Congo (DRC), Nepal, 
in the joint Timor-Leste/Indonesia process, Liberia, 
Kenya, and Korea, but not in the sole Timor-Leste mo-
del, show the problems in having a process where a TC 
simply recommends amnesty. These models, besides 
the Timor-Leste process (for its own contextual rea-
sons), show that few perpetrators trust these processes 
enough to come forward in any numbers. They seemin-
gly will not engage in a process in which an institution 
only recommends amnesty. It seems as though a greater 
degree of  certainty is needed for them to testify and 
provide information about their crimes without some 
protection against criminal or civil liability. 
Thus, when TCs are given the power to grant am-
nesty they seem to attract more applicants. The reason 
being that in this case, there is only one level of  ad-
150  N. V. Nwogu, “When and Why it Started: Deconstruct-
ing Victim-Centered Truth Commissions in the Context of  Eth-
nicity-Based Conflict”, International Journal of  Transitional Justice, 4 
(2010):275.
ministrator to convince, not two. Also it is presumed 
that TCs will exercise their decision making in a less 
political, more partisan way. When it comes to TCs re-
commending amnesty the overall position seems to be 
that this methodology seems not to inspire confidence 
from would-be applicants. They seem to shy away from 
a two-step process (TC and then government decision) 
that sees a final decision being taken by political actors. 
The South African experience also seems to indicate 
that where there are judges involved. and that if  some 
of  them come from same group as the perpetrators the-
re will be greater trust in the process. 
Thus, a truth commission process that grants am-
nesty rather than recommending amnesty seems prefe-
rable. It is more likely to achieve the result that perpe-
trators will engage with the truth recovery process. It is 
however quite context specific and depends on how it 
is established, how complex it is, whether perpetrators 
trust the system and whether they believe they need am-
nesty. Perpetrators will, before deciding whether to en-
ter a conditional amnesty, weigh up whether they need 
amnesty and whether there is likelihood that they will 
be prosecuted if  they do not apply. Thus, conditional 
amnesties will work if  the state shows that it has the will 
and ability to carry out such prosecutions.
If  the state is not willing to grant amnesty it may be 
useful to grant the institution doing the truth recovery 
the powers to grant use immunity. If  use immunity is 
given to disclosures which are provided to a TC, this 
would induce more people to divulge information.151 
While the value of  these immunities can be questioned, 
as prosecutors would know about the crimes commit-
ted and can look for evidence elsewhere, the level of  
protection might still be sufficient for perpetrators to 
come forward. 
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